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Abstract  
Recent developments in control hold that professionals are best managed through normative 
and concertive as opposed to bureaucratic and coercive mechanisms. This post-structuralist 
approach appeals to the notion of congruent values and norms and acknowledges the role of 
individuals’ subjectivity in sustaining professional autonomy. Yet, there remains a risk of 
over-simplifying the manifestations of such control initiatives. By means of an in-depth case 
study, this article considers the challenge of implementing a knowledge-sharing portal for a 
community of R&D scientists through management control initiatives that relied on the 
rhetoric of a blend of ‘facilitation’ and presumed ‘peer pressure’. Arguing that traditional 
approaches such as normative/concertive control and soft bureaucracy only partially explain 
this phenomenon, we draw from Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘symbolic violence’ to interpret 
a managerial initiative to appropriate knowledge and affirm the structure of social relations 
through the complicity of R&D scientists. We also examine how the scientists channelled 
resistance by reconstituting compliance in line with their sense of identity as creators of 
knowledge.    
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Introduction 
Following Waring and Currie’s (2009, p.767) finding that ‘attempts to engender normative 
change and compliance amongst clinicians remain problematic,’ this paper puts forward the 
argument that understanding how organizations ‘manage’ professionals requires a shift in 
emphasis away from the contemporary emphasis on how managers impose normative control 
strategies to how they construct willing compliance that is congruent with individual 
reflexivity. Recent critiques of normative control point to the increasing tendency to distract 
employees’ attention from the dysfunctions of conventional controls while ultimately only 
prescribing ‘freedom around control’ (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011). Drawing from Weber and 
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Courpasson (2000, p. 142) posits the notion of ‘soft bureaucracy’ whereby domination arising 
from the legitimate use of power is not ‘exerted by means of, for example, violence, direct 
punishment or local hierarchical supervision, but through sophisticated managerial strategies.’ 
The notion of ‘soft bureaucracy’ to achieve ‘political centralization’ while recognizing that 
organizations are more entrepreneurial and decentralized is one that we find particularly 
pertinent for this paper. Courpasson’s purpose is to understand domination in terms of the 
strategies senior management develop ‘to control elite groups’ (Courpasson, 2000, p. 152). 
          Our purpose is not to determine how senior managers ‘control’ professionals, but how 
efforts to solicit willing sharing of knowledge become a form of control amongst 
professionals who exhibit characteristics that Courpasson (2000) identifies as defining ‘elites’: 
they exhibit ‘self-governance’, their power stems from control over uncertainty, they are 
concerned with protecting their reputation, and their legitimacy arises from a convergence of 
their autonomy and organization efficiency. Our point of departure is twofold: whereas in 
Courpasson’s (2000) study senior management resorted to a strategy of ‘proving and 
normalizing professional success’ which included assessment grids and criteria to define 
success, at our case study, a global confectionary firm we name Confect, senior management 
developed no such metrics; exhortations to share knowledge did not appear to give 
management licence to integrate professionals into what Courpasson (2000, p. 153) refers to 
as ‘a general system of governance through tools of performance appraisal.’  
          Similarly, the ‘objectivating personal responsibility’ Courpasson identifies as a second 
control strategy was not evident in our case study. Rather than producing mechanisms for 
defining expected activities, and attributing initiatives and decisions, senior management at 
Confect took a laissez-faire approach, and treated a highly publicised knowledge-sharing 
system as purely voluntary. We wanted to look beneath the stated notion of ‘voluntary 
participation’ to understand why management would go to the lengths of creating a top-level 
global knowledge management team to oversee this resource-critical initiative and yet treat it 
as purely voluntary, put little or no visible mechanism in place to monitor use and 
effectiveness, and leave it entirely to the discretion of a community of researchers with little 
mention of ‘bottom-line’ implications.   
          Hence, this paper seeks to shed new light on the organizational pursuit of legitimacy by 
examining how domination is realized not through managerial strategies informed by ‘threat 
and potential repression’ (Courpasson, 2000, p. 159) but through a subtle appeal to willing 
compliance that is neither extracted through performance management mechanisms nor 
stimulated by rewards as in normative control. Furthermore, we argue that complicity and 
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acquiescence do not, unlike orthodox normative control, assume that employees will 
subscribe to the managerial narrative because it is consistent with their own values and 
aspirations. Thus, we draw from Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory to examine how the quest for 
complicity relies on mis-recognizing control strategies. Our key contribution is to 
demonstrate the use of power which relies not on coercive or normative control but on the 
(Bourdieusian) complicity of highly autonomous professionals (in this case R&D scientists) 
who are nevertheless prepared to define their compliance on their own reflexive terms.   
          The context of this analysis of complicity is a knowledge-sharing initiative rather than 
control for its own sake. It is therefore necessary to set out briefly the case for knowledge 
management. Prior research has tended to focus on deriving ‘rents’ from productive activities 
(Grant, 1996), the integration, diffusion, and protection of knowledge (e.g. Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2001; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), thus ensuring effective sharing and preventing 
leakage (Tallman & Phene, 2007). A more critical strand has developed which looks at how 
knowledge is reified, the political, ideological, identity, situated, and power issues associated 
with ‘managing’ and appropriating knowledge (e.g. Bowman & Swart, 2007; Brivot, 2011; 
Collins & Smith, 2006; Kamoche & Maguire, 2011; Schultze & Stabbel, 2005; Tsoukas, 
1996), thus shedding light on how and why individuals might act in their own self-interest. 
Previous attempts to understand how knowledge management systems secure the knowledge 
of organizational members and disseminate it to other potential users have drawn for example 
from social capital theory (Dyer & Nobeaka, 2000; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Foss, Husted and 
Michailova (2010) found that much of the knowledge sharing literature is concerned with 
constructs, processes largely at the ‘macro’, i.e. collective/organizational levels. They call for, 
inter alia, research into how governance mechanisms shape employees’ knowledge-sharing 
behaviour, a call we heed with respect to the role of control.    
         The debate on experts/expertise, professionals, identity and culture within knowledge-
intensive firms (KIFs) (Alvesson, 1993; Robertson & Swan, 2003) is particularly pertinent to 
this paper. For example, Robertson and Swan (2003) explore the theme of knowledge 
workers conniving in their own control with respect to Willmott’s (1993) notion of slavery. 
Thus, ‘instead of top-down normative control, where those in power generate norms for those 
who are not, […] consultants themselves developed strong norms based on ambiguity that 
secured both their own freedom and their own slavery to the organization’ (Robertson & 
Swan, 2003, p. 852). Reed (1996) suggests that technologies not only permit high degrees of 
visibility and transparency, but they also lead individuals to internalize ‘self-discipline and 
control’. Individuals allow their subjectivity to be defined through surveillance (Sewell, 
4 
 
1988), as transparency and visibility prevent them from hiding from the ‘supervisory gaze’ 
(Reed, 1996). This is an important analytical tool for unravelling control that is deliberately 
geared at subjugating the individual through normalization. However, where efforts at 
normalization through disciplinary control and subjection (Foucault, 1975) are either 
incomplete or ambiguous as in Confect, it is necessary to seek alternative explanations for 
actions consistent with ‘self-discipline’.     
          Confect introduced a knowledge management system in a subtle and non-threatening 
manner which they described in terms of ‘leadership and facilitation’, and expected to rely on 
peer pressure rather than overt control. Yet, to the extent that social actors ultimately 
determine the extent and degree of their involvement in sharing knowledge, the 
organization’s capacity to secure legitimacy for the knowledge appropriation system is 
potentially circumscribed. While recognizing that employee resistance is closely tied to 
managerial control mechanisms (e.g. Jermier, Knights, & Nord, 1994; Waring & Currie, 
2009) the most intriguing question for us was how management expected to secure 
compliance without overtly relying on normative or coercive control. Pierre Bourdieu’s work 
seemed appropriate in our analysis because of the way Bourdieu treats power, control, and 
legitimation in social settings defined by the use of capital in organizational and institutional 
fields in which there is no visible conflict (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998), which is 
particularly pertinent to our case study. In particular, we consider Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic violence suitable because it is about relations of domination, and for its focus on the 
struggles between ‘fractions’ within ‘dominant classes’ united by habitus rather than class 
conflict, and its concern with tensions that are not always recognized for what they are (see 
also DiMaggio, 1979).      
          We seek to examine how a ‘dominant’ authority (in this case a senior management 
team) sought control with the complicity of the ‘dominated’ (R&D scientists) (Bourdieu, 
1991; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Yet, to the extent that the latter exercise agency and are 
prepared to calibrate their compliance, the boundary between ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ 
becomes blurred. Our focus on Bourdieu’s less well-known concept of symbolic violence 
does not imply that symbolic violence can be viewed as separate from his better known 
concepts, capital, habitus and field. In fact, these four are best seen as ‘an architecture’ of 
interrelated concepts, whereby symbolic violence is objectified in physical objects, 
certificates and other forms of cultural capital as well as in persons as habitus (Robinson & 
Kerr, 2009; Wacquant, 2002).    
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          Below, we offer a brief critique of the normative control literature, and set out our 
rationale for positing a symbolic violence approach. We then offer the case study, and 
consider how the scientists’ own experience and conception of knowledge-sharing challenged 
yet legitimized the managerial knowledge-sharing initiative. We conclude with some 
thoughts for further research.    
Control, resistance and complicity 
Whereas the definition of the artefacts of knowledge was previously accompanied by 
important sociological questions about the powerful role of the ‘technocracy’, (e.g. Bell, 1973; 
Drucker, 1993; Galbraith, 1967), the current preoccupation with knowledge management is 
largely about constructs (Foss et al., 2010) and the mechanisms of sharing knowledge (e.g. 
Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Hansen, 2002; Tallman & Phene, 2007). This approach appears not 
to have fully engaged the question of power and control (see also Bartunek, 2002; Clegg, 
2002; Hinnings, 2002). This is a worrying trend given what we know about the role of power 
in and around organizations, the prevalence of management controls on human behaviour, the 
‘politics of expertise’ (Alvesson, 2001; Drazin, 1990; Reed, 1996), trust, domination and 
legitimacy (Courpasson, 2000; Grey & Garsten, 2001), the quest for emotional identification 
with the firm (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011; Kunda, 1992). Following earlier debates on the 
tension between rewards and control over expertise (Reed, 1996), scholars have begun to 
explore issues such as how professionals negotiate claims to ‘property’ in their work 
(Pinnington, Kamoche, & Suseno, 2009), and the ‘struggle of ownership’ between actors 
engaged in contests over ‘value capture’ (Bowman & Swart, 2007, p. 488). 
          Traditionally, scholars have related normative control to professionals as it departs 
from coercive control and relies on instilling shared values, beliefs and attitudes (Etzioni, 
1964). It is consistent with ‘clans’ which rely on socialization to eliminate goal incongruence, 
high degrees of interaction and frequent communication and sharing of ideas (Ouchi, 1979; 
Turner & Makhija, 2006). A critique has emerged which challenges the insidious effects of 
normative/concertive forms of control which rely on fostering and rewarding the desired 
norms and values (e.g. Alvesson, 1993; Barker, 1993; Kunda, 1992; Robertson & Swan, 2003; 
Willmott, 1993). Barker (1993) found that ‘concertive control’ which also relies on normative 
rules and value consensus generated through members’ interactions ultimately achieved even 
tighter control. Through shared values they themselves created and policed, the ‘team 
members had become both their own masters and their own slaves’ (Barker, 1993, p. 433). 
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Robertson and Swan (2003) have shown how normative control was achieved through the 
regulation of identity based on elitism. Scientists thus lent their loyalty and compliance to 
corporate objectives and consented to collaborate on projects because they effectively tied 
their identity as ‘the experts’ to the corporate identity of elitism the firm fostered. Fleming 
and Sturdy (2011) challenge the authenticity of the experience of identifying with the work 
itself through playful expressions of self.   
         Taken together, these contributions demonstrate that the presumption of goal-
congruence, interest-alignment and shared values is prone to generating oppressive effects 
(Kunda, 1992; Willmott, 1993). We build on this critique to re-examine the nature of 
acquiescence that is framed in terms of the seemingly ‘willing’ participation of employees. In 
Barker’s (1993) case study, peer pressure was effective in creating a control regime that 
worked through shared value consensus. Similarly, Raelin (2011, p. 142) argues that team 
members can ‘presumably control themselves collectively by identifying those among the 
group who are shirking or failing to achieve productive targets’. At Confect, management 
relied on presumed peer pressure which they hoped would realize compliance; yet where 
pressure peer came into play, and it functioned in surprisingly different ways.  
         Evidence shows that the use of power and control triggers acts of resistance ranging 
from overt, antagonistic/recalcitrant actions towards capitalist production, to a more 
dialectical, negotiated scenario and the appeal to subjectivity and the discursive practices 
individuals engage in for example to reclaim their identity and redefine power relations 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Ball & Wilson, 2000; Collinson, 1994; Courpasson, 2000; 
Delbridge & Ezzamel, 2005; Symon, 2005; Thomas & Davies, 2005; Waring & Currie, 2009). 
Thomas and Davies (2005, p. 685) argue that the tendency to construct resistance ‘within a 
negative paradigm, a worker corps kicking back against management control’ means that 
certain groups and certain nuances of resistance, and motivations for resisting remain under-
researched. A contribution which appears to address this challenge is Waring and Currie’s 
(2009) study of doctors whose resistance to managerial prerogative and bureaucratic 
knowledge management procedures involved, inter alia, co-opting and adapting management 
procedures in line with the subjective interpretation of their own identity. For these authors, 
efforts to realize compliance remain a challenge. Similarly, Delbridge and Ezzamel (2005, p. 
606) argue that the debate on control based on values, traditions and beliefs has led to further 
interest in control through ‘internalized compliance’ as opposed to ‘external constraint’.   
           It seems to us there is a need to enhance understanding of the nature of compliance, 
how it is elicited, and how it recursively constitutes a form of resistance particularly amongst 
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professionals such as R&D scientists who enjoy high degrees of operational autonomy and 
whose knowledge is closely tied to how they define their identity. While Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) describe managers as ‘knowledge-engineers’, a view that invests in 
managers positional legitimacy in the exercise of power and control, Swan, Scarbrough, and 
Robertson (2002) have characterized managers’ ability to exploit ‘communities of practice’ 
in order to legitimize new practices where they recognize they are up against more powerful 
professional groups. These scenarios highlight the contested nature of the knowledge-
appropriation context, one in which tacit knowledge is not directly appropriable because it 
cannot be directly transferred (Grant, 1996), and where it cannot be taken for granted that 
people will willingly share knowledge (Currie & Kerrin, 2003). This in turn raises important 
questions not just about power asymmetry but also about identity, whereby individuals either 
through strong cohesive groups or individually come to identify themselves with certain work 
practices (Shamir, 1991) and determine the form and extent of their engagement with 
technology.   
Bourdieusian symbolic violence 
The significance of Bourdieu’s relational theory of sociology which embraces his key 
constructs, capital, habitus, and field is now increasingly acknowledged (DiMaggio, 1979; 
Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Bourdieu argues that the possession of capital (e.g. cultural, 
symbolic, economic, juridical, educational), confers on the holder powers that have the 
potential to re-define the configuration of power relations. An emergent body of work has 
focused on these three constructs (e.g. Cooper, 2008; McLeod, O’Donohue, & Townley, 
2009; Morean, 2009; Mutch, 2003; O’Mahoney, 2007; Oakes et al., 1998; Townley, Beech, 
& McKinlay, 2009). A Journal of Management Studies special issue (Lampel & Meyer, 2008) 
was devoted to the notion of ‘field-configuring events’ where the conception of field drew 
heavily from Bourdieu’s work.    
          Symbolic violence refers to the exercise of force or power upon social agents with their 
complicit acceptance (Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Bourdieu illustrates this 
concept in various ways, such as in gift-giving, an act whose embedded reciprocity imposes a 
form of domination over the recipient, ultimately misrecognizing the economic reality of the 
exchange. Symbolic violence manifests itself in three ways which are key to our analysis: it 
seeks to change ‘what is at stake’ through the power of pedagogy; it invokes mechanisms of 
social control which are not always explicit; and it works through mis-recognition, realizing 
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while denying social realities (Bourdieu, 1998, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Pedagogy is 
equivalent to learning a new language, and more importantly, acquiescing in the legitimacy 
of this language and accepting it as the legitimate way to communicate. Bourdieu and 
Boltanski (1984) illustrate this by showing how a language assumes legitimacy even amongst 
those who do not speak it but nevertheless accept its superiority to theirs as in the case of an 
‘official’ language. The ‘dominated’ succumb to meconnaisance (misrecognition) brought 
about by the reconnaissance (recognition) of the legitimacy of the superior language 
(Bourdieu & Boltanski, 1975). Thus, the use of a ‘superior language’, gift, or the educational 
system imposes a ‘cultural arbitrary’ to express the objective interests of the dominant 
groups/classes.  
          The ‘cultural arbitrary’ is a condition that expresses the arbitrary imposition of power by 
misrecognizing its effects and purpose and ultimately reproducing and legitimizing social 
inequality. Moore (2004, p. 447) captures the essence of the cultural arbitrary as follows: ‘Once 
it is acknowledged that the positions and relations of the cultural field are valorized by power 
relations rather than by aesthetic qualities inherent to them, then they can be recognized as 
arbitrary and their imposition through pedagogic action seen as constituting “symbolic 
violence”’. Thus, dominant groups conceal the fact that their cultural power (achieved for 
example through a ‘superior’ language) reproduces while disguising social stratification and 
class interests (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). The effect of symbolic violence is 
that the dominant group determines the appropriate way to function, and acquires legitimacy 
for arbitrary power relations - a ‘cultural arbitrary’ - (in our case a knowledge management 
portal) through the complicity of the ‘dominated’. There is nothing inherently or intrinsically 
superior about the portal; it has meaning only relationally, meaning that it reflects the tastes and 
interests of those who ‘arbitrarily’ hold power (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Robinson and 
Kerr (2009) show how symbolic violence becomes a way of conceptualizing legitimate 
domination, where structural domination is misrecognized by followers as ‘charm’, or ‘as the 
attributes of the ‘natural leader’ (Robinson & Kerr, 2009, p. 881).They have also examined 
how symbolic violence in banking came to be maintained by ‘economic violence’ which in turn 
counted as symbolic capital outside the organization; thus symbolic violence truly becomes a 
relationship of domination (Kerr & Robinson, 2012). Besides the educational context (Moore, 
2004), the concept of a ‘cultural arbitrary’ is beginning to generate some interest in 
organization studies. For example, Kamoche and Pinnington (2012) have examined the 
ideological underpinnings of organizational spirituality through the lens of symbolic violence, 
with reference to the cultural arbitrary of managerial power and the effects of pedagogy. 
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         By relying on complicity as opposed to coercion, symbolic violence has resonances with 
‘concertive control’ in self-managed teams, and members’ collaborative actions (Barker, 1993), 
but goes further by tying complicity to misrecognition, ideology and legitimation. While it 
appears to be taken for granted that socialized professionals grant the organization their 
complicity as they respond say to symbolic and financial rewards (Kunda, 1992), symbolic 
violence allows us to problematize complicity and also to understand how it constitutes a form 
of resistance. Conflict and resistance are as prevalent as compliance and consent (Jermier, 
Knights, & Nord, 1994); for us, resistance manifests itself to the extent that compliance is 
never a fait accompli but is in part contingent on the way individuals define the form and extent 
of participation in managerial exhortations to share knowledge. Thus, we position our 
contribution in terms of how management sought voluntary compliance for a knowledge-
sharing portal while misrecognizing the power-political dynamic that was central to realizing 
managerial control.   
     
The Confect Case Study: research setting and methodology  
Confect is a global confectionary maker which employs about 60,000 people worldwide. We 
selected this firm in order to examine the circumstances surrounding its introduction of a new 
knowledge management system which, during a two-year period after its inception, had 
created a buzz in the Australia media. It seemed appropriate to opt for a case study approach 
that would enable us to hear the voices of the management team that was spear-heading the 
initiative, as well as a sample of R&D scientists for whom the knowledge-sharing portal had 
been created. Our purpose was to interpret the phenomenon at the level of meaning, to 
develop theory as opposed to pursuing empirical validation. This approach is consistent with 
prior work on control (e.g. Barker, 1993; McLoughlin, Badham, & Palmer, 2005; Robertson 
& Swan, 2003) and on Bourdieu’s social theory (e.g. McLeod et al., 2009; Morean, 2009; 
Oakes et al., 1998; Robinson & Kerr, 2009) which informs our analysis.  
           We held a total of fifteen interviews, three in Phase 1 (1 male, 2 female), and twelve in 
Phase 2 (6 male, 6 female). Phase 1 took place in Australia in 2007, with the globally 
dispersed executive Knowledge Management Team (KMT) which comprised of three people: 
Global Technical Director (GTD), Knowledge Process and Data Manager (KPDM) (both 
based in Australia); and Technical Knowledge Manager (TKM) (based in the UK). The KMT 
reported to the VP, Technical Knowledge, who was based in the USA. This team was 
responsible for introducing a knowledge management system for the company’s research 
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scientists and technicians. Extensive interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire 
were conducted with the three executives: face-to-face with the two Australia-based ones, 
and by tele-conference with the UK-based one. Using standard case study protocol (Yin, 
1994), respondents were asked open-ended questions followed by probing questions. These 
interviews, which on average lasted ninety minutes, covered a wide range of topics on the 
company’s objectives in setting up a knowledge management system, the types of 
knowledge-sharing the system was designed to accomplish, the challenges that were being 
faced in the process and how these initiatives were linked to human resource practices.  
          Access to scientists was not granted until three years later (Phase 2), a delay which 
ultimately worked in our favour by enabling us to take stock of how the knowledge 
management system had unravelled, and the extent to which it had become embedded and 
accepted. Nevertheless, access was limited, and we interviewed five managers and seven 
R&D staff, four in the UK and three in Australia. The approach we took and the number of 
subjects interviewed are considered adequate for a case study analysis (Yin, 1994; Easterby-
Smith, 1994). For Phase 2, the interviews in Australia were by telephone and those in the UK 
face to face. The R&D staff and Phase 2 managers were selected from those who were 
available and willing to speak to us. The interviewees were evenly spread; amongst the seven 
males: four managers and three R&D staff; amongst the eight females: four managers and 
four R&D staff. In Phase 2 of the project, interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes. Questions 
to the R&D staff revolved around their motivations for, and experience of knowledge-sharing, 
and their exposure to the knowledge-sharing technology. We did not specifically seek to 
confirm/corroborate the claims made by the managers, but instead wanted to allow them to 
tell their own story of knowledge-sharing.    
           All the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. We triangulated them with 
archival materials relating to the strategic thinking behind the inception and operation of the 
knowledge management system, various published reports, some company newsletters, and 
our field notes. Guided tours of the office, factory and recreational premises where we were 
able to observe people at work, also gave us a useful glimpse into the working lives of the 
employees, the pressures they endured to deliver new products through collaboration, and the 
sense of community they wished to create and be a part of. The data were analysed using 
inductive techniques in order to gain in-depth knowledge of a process within a single case 
study, as opposed to capturing a snap-shot at a point in time (see also Ragin, 1994). In an 
approach consistent with narrative analysis and interpretation (Gabriel, 2000; Pinnington et 
al., 2009), the transcribed responses were checked against the tape-recordings and field notes, 
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coded according to topic and subjected to a series of iterations until specific themes and 
stories began to emerge. These themes and stories were corroborated against each other and 
double-checked against the field notes, thus ensuring the integrity of the data. Our analysis 
was guided by replication rather than sampling logic (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1994), and aimed to critique and extend extant theory on control within the 
context of knowledge management.  
Research findings  
The centre piece of the knowledge management (KM) system at Confect was an online 
sharing space, hereafter referred to as Confect-Portal, in which project or product research 
‘communities’ were encouraged to participate through interaction and knowledge-sharing. 
The objective was to break down barriers so knowledge could be leveraged and diffused 
across the organization. This is consistent with the view that knowledge-sharing systems are 
designed, inter alia, to ‘motivate individual members to participate and contribute knowledge 
to the collective good’ (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000, p. 348). The KMT maintained that there was 
no compulsion to participate and that the purpose was to provide a virtual space whereby 
functionally-viable content would emerge organically through voluntary collaboration and 
peer pressure, and where interaction would ultimately drive performance. However, the 
findings reveal some fundamental differences between the way the KMT conceived of 
Confect-Portal and the way the R&D scientists understood and utilized it. We juxtapose these 
realities and proceed to offer a theoretical interpretation of what we perceive to be 
management’s underlying purpose in creating the portal. First we discuss our initial 
observation of two themes which emerged as characterizing the functioning of the 
knowledge-sharing mechanism, and which pave the way for an explication of symbolic 
violence: (1) leadership and the rhetoric of facilitation, and (2) subtle control through 
presumed socialization.   
Leadership and the rhetoric of facilitation 
The approach to knowledge management/sharing was framed in terms of leadership and 
empowering people:  
We do have a top-down approach, providing information that the 
leaders can communicate. The leaders are not going to be out there 
driving the knowledge activities, but they have to be visibly supporting 
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them … but the knowledge that is created is really happening at the 
ground level, it’s down in the communities themselves. (GTD)  
In practical terms, leadership in knowledge sharing was operationalized amongst 
managers by including ‘collaboration’ amongst the competences (or ‘leadership imperatives’) 
that managers are judged upon. As for empowerment, a manager reported: 
I think we’ve worked on our leadership. I think that isn’t really a 
barrier. I think they see that there’s value in the job they’re doing or 
my team is doing, and they’re quite happy to go along, so long as we 
give them empowerment and they need to be led through that. (KPDM).  
After some initial resistance, the KMT understood that leadership based on a directive 
approach would not work, which shows they acknowledged the limitations of bureaucratic 
control for appropriating knowledge. According to the GTD, initial efforts to ‘obviously push 
people into sharing’ proved counter-productive and it was considered more effective ‘to note 
and encourage positive behaviours and quietly discourage negative ones’.  
People are sceptical about changing the way they’ve always done 
things … but once you sit down with them and explain the benefits so 
they get something out of the database then they’re more likely to 
contribute, but it’s just getting that change in direction that’s hard. It 
takes me, really, physically to have a meeting with those individuals to 
really change their behaviours, and there is not enough of me to go 
round. (TKM) 
 We’re not specifically targeting, you know, trying to take the tacit 
knowledge, and making it explicit and putting it into a system because 
you never quite know what is going to be useful for people, like 
something that has been useful for me might have no use at all for 
anyone else. But then something that I’m not even aware of could be 
made great use of by someone, maybe. (GTD)  
This position reflects the challenge Confect faces in adopting a suitable method to 
achieve ‘knowledge capture’. The GTD’s statement exemplifies the ambiguity surrounding 
the value of knowledge possessed by the scientists, as well as the potential futility of micro-
managing the knowledge-sharing process. According to the GTD, while the ultimate purpose 
of knowledge management was to ‘get people to share what they know, and to use that 
information in order to generate some benefits’, the role of the KM team was ‘to get people 
to interact and share knowledge without letting the employees feel that managers are 
applying too much control’, hence facilitation, which enabled a much more subtle form of 
control.  
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Facilitation, as a surrogate for leadership and control, was the catchphrase that drove 
through the KM experience at Confect: facilitation from top to bottom, from managers to 
scientists and amongst the scientists themselves and even across functions. While the portal’s 
key customers are the R&D group, the ethos of facilitation was expected to spread across the 
firm. However, we found only scanty evidence of how it worked in practice, which leads us 
to the view that it was more hype and aspiration than a concrete and realizable strategy.      
The rest of the organization is watching what we’re doing …like the 
HR [group] have shared a lot more information based on them coming 
and discussing with us what we’re doing … the Finance people have 
done the same. So, though we haven’t got direct responsibility for 
those areas, what we’re doing is influencing them. (GTD) 
The above shows how the expected effect on other departments lends credibility to, and 
is a potential source of legitimacy for the KMT’s knowledge-sharing initiative. The 
expression ‘facilitation’ was used repeatedly to signal the idea that there was no compulsion, 
and that management’s purpose was merely to create an enabling environment, even though 
there was no mechanism to evaluate the system. Except for some basic internet tools that kept 
tabs on frequency of visits (i.e. portal activity), there were no tangible metrics to measure the 
effectiveness of Confect-Portal as a knowledge-sharing and networking system. Instead, 
management relied upon ambiguous observations that included: subjective perceptions about 
‘volume of collaboration’, ‘strong pool of resources’, perception of ‘faster and bigger 
results’, ‘enhanced sense of community’, ‘selflessness’, ‘enhanced trust’, etc. It was 
noteworthy that some of the product communities took the initiative to engage in some form 
of self-evaluation which was about improving themselves, and which demonstrates how they 
chose to assess participation on their own terms based on the meanings they themselves 
attached to the portal.     
… we meet at an innovation forum once a month and share issues like 
are we joining up effectively and what can be done to improve. 
(Innovation Planner)  
One example of facilitation in action which also served as a form of positive 
reinforcement was when an American team started to research fruit-flavoured beverages. 
Working through the portal, they discovered that a European team had recently developed a 
fruit-flavoured product. The KM team reportedly played a key role in facilitating an 
understanding of the need for the European team to pass on their knowledge to ‘avoid 
reinventing the wheel’. Similar initiatives were cascaded through public recognition in 
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newsletters, praise and by facilitating emulation in the rest of the community. The KMT did 
not believe facilitation was a foregone conclusion. The GTD reported that facilitation is prone 
to ‘drying up, and you therefore need continuity through management initiative’, which 
meant resorting to residual managerial control. Facilitation thus emerges as the subtle use of 
power to influence behaviour through social interaction, but if that failed, other forms of 
control (couched as ‘management initiative’) could be employed. The challenge for the 
global KMT is how to ensure that managers remain the ‘knowledge engineers’ (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995) who are in the driving seat and yet remain inconspicuous in order not to 
alienate the community of scientists with obtrusive control mechanisms. Yet, questions arose 
as to the efficacy of the facilitation narrative when some managers who managed R&D staff 
appeared to be inadequately informed about the KMT’s purpose.  
I thought [GTD] was setting a couple of intranet sets – where you can 
go and post up information.  I don’t know what specifically [GTD] had 
done only because he was involved in so many different things and I 
wasn’t involved in most of them. (Regulatory Affairs Manager) 
 This ambiguity reveals the limits of facilitation, and suggests to us the beginnings of 
mis-recognition. The KMT correctly assessed the significance of collaboration and teamwork, 
but their assumptions about how the process of scientific collaboration worked did not 
entirely tally with the scientists’ own experience. All the scientists agreed that their work 
involved a high degree of collaboration, by as much as 50% to 80%, and 100% in the case of 
one Innovation Planner. They also agreed that some form of virtual sharing space was crucial 
for their collaboration as it offered added value to the ‘traditional mechanisms’ such as 
telephones and email. The passive and exclusive nature of the portal was captured as follows: 
It’s not so much conversational, it’s more of a repository for results 
you might have gained or reports you’ve written or information you’ve 
generated that you want everybody to share or you’d like people to 
look at. They’re only accessible to people within that project team. 
(Polymer Chemist) 
Similarly, the scientists tend to have their own personal networks that they can use to 
identify potential collaborators, and which do not need to be mediated through a public portal 
instigated and managed from the top. The other notable shortcoming of the system was that 
certain categories, e.g. junior scientists could not post their ideas directly and had to go 
through a supervisor. As one Consumer Science Scientist said: ‘it’s more really kind of an 
archive to look back at but it’s not actually interactive information sharing.’ This obstacle 
was not apparent to the KMT. The two most commonly cited reasons for not engaging with 
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the portal were: lack of time, and the existence of alternative knowledge-retrieval and sharing 
mechanisms which were more user-friendly, some of which were offshoots of Confect-Portal. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the portal was not monolithic and that scientists had found 
ways to modify or navigate around it, which demonstrates both agency and a form of 
resistance that challenged the KMT’s position and enabled the scientists to re-define 
participation and knowledge-sharing.  
Subtle control through presumed socialization  
Control relied on elements of clan and normative forms: the use of a virtual team which 
fostered interaction and communication, a shared sense of community amongst researchers 
united in their collective scientific knowledge, and a social context where specific 
behavioural performance and outcomes cannot be prescribed with any specificity nor are they 
directly measurable. Clan controls target longer-term and broader tasks and goals (Turner & 
Makhija, 2006), a characteristic which is consistent with the ambiguity inherent in the 
functioning of Confect-Portal. The nature of the work itself is not ambiguous, as the scientists 
are charged with researching and delivering new recipes and products, and are subject to 
standard performance management. Following Ouchi (1980) and Wiener (1982) we argue 
that the research scientists were presumed to act in the interests of the organization through 
their day-to-day work, and were expected to lend their commitment to the knowledge-sharing 
initiative (hence to the organization) without coercion and in the absence of overt 
surveillance (hence the lack of performance criteria). To further accentuate the voluntary 
nature of participation, formal rewards were deliberately excluded from this initiative. The 
KMT instead capitalized on the notion of intrinsic satisfaction under the assumption that 
public recognition and symbolic rewards were more consistent with organizationally-
socialized professionals (see also Kunda, 1992).  
 
Scientists are interesting creatures. You know, a public recognition 
goes a long way …they like to be patted on the back. (GTD) 
… we’re giving a lot of public recognition to people who have shared, 
and that has changed the behaviour in a positive way rather than 
going out and looking for the negatives … we’ve got a monthly 
newsletter that goes out to a couple thousand people…the stories that 
these people got together and did that and did that great, with links 
back to the Portal if they want to go back and look at the information, 
and you can see, you know, that when the newsletter goes out, the 
visits to the site go up and … it’s more of a carrot approach than a 
stick approach. (GTD) 
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People feel really recognised and rewarded for being in the 
newsletter … We’ve introduced a new feature called ‘tales from the 
field’, which allows us to go out there and talk to people … what they 
are doing everyday rather than the senior leaders telling them what to 
do. That’s been very successful … and they’ve found it really 
rewarding. They may have been recognised when they’re going round 
their business and people say ‘oh I read that…’ and that works well. 
(Technologies and Engagement Manager) 
Pressed further on the benefits to the individual, she said: 
I think that one of the ways that they are rewarded is through the 
newsletter … and then obviously we all have our performance review. 
If they come up with a really good idea they get recognised from their 
peers …that’s what makes them proud, that’s what makes them feel 
recognised and rewarded, the fact that they’ve created this product 
that’s now in the stores … that’s the big success. (Technologies and 
Engagement Manager)  
This positive reinforcement of behaviour in upholding consensual values and collective 
discipline, which typifies ‘concertive control’ (Barker, 1993), served management well 
because it freed them from having to use more directive, coercive, or bureaucratic forms of 
control. Comments by R&D staff about the extent of voluntary sharing attest to this:  
 
Most people are keen to look at new systems, maybe it’s the scientist in 
them but they are happy to have a go.  I have not found any resistance 
whatsoever here. (Data Specialist) 
The organizational culture was often cited to explain the willingness to share: 
We do have a culture of people who are really friendly and really open 
which I think helps. People have actually said when they come here, 
what a lovely bunch of people there are, everyone’s really welcoming. 
Perhaps it is a culture that the founders have built and from the 
beginning their whole culture was around the people, looking after the 
people and nurturing the people. (Technologies and Engagement 
Manager) 
Thus, while the KMT relied on socialization through the R&D scientists’ presumed 
commitment to their community of practice, they were careful not to take it for granted that 
the organization could appropriate it, hence signalling the limitations of normative control:   
When you look at people leaving the company or department, have you 
actually captured that knowledge? … there’s always going to be 
information that they store in their heads that you’re never gonna get 
to. (KPDM) 
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When someone actually leaves, we realize that we haven’t captured 
the information that we need to. I’m doing more mentoring 
programmes and things like that … we don’t have any sort of 
organized approach. It’s much more ad hoc and loosely implemented. 
It’s a gap in our programme. (TKM) 
The foregoing leads us to consider how the realities of sharing knowledge and 
resistance might be understood. 
The limits of sharing: resistance in action 
This section considers how sharing knowledge was shaped by the realities of the scientists’ 
training and professional socialization and how these scenarios constitute a form of resistance. 
Managers believed that the two most common reasons for failing to participate in the Portal 
were lack of time and too much information.   
A big challenge is people thinking that they don’t have time to share or 
to talk … it’s the attitude, it’s the behaviour that people think they’ve 
got such big deadlines … so that they don’t make time for those 
conference calls or for networking time. Often those times could 
actually save them time on their projects. (TKM) 
I have not encountered people being negative. People don’t mind 
sharing but it’s the time to share. The forum time and time differences 
hinder that … Getting people at the same time is the difficult bit – 
whilst we tell people it’s a great opportunity. It’s something that they 
say they’ll look at, at some point. (Process Systems Manager) 
The KMT believed that the potential for hoarding knowledge did exist, and that it was 
driven by selfish interests, and could be linked to concerns about job security and loss of 
power: 
There’s probably a little bit of reluctance to share because people 
think they are the holder of information the company couldn’t do 
without. (KPDM)  
They’re not giving up their baby. They’re scientists. They work two 
years on something, and just hand over all their learning to someone 
they haven’t met before? (TKM)  
We’ve got experts in their field who’ve been in the company for a long 
time. And if they write that knowledge or the processes or things down 
and give them to someone else, they’ve lost, you know, they may lose, 
they feel they’ve lost part of their power and that leads to low 
employability … (TKM)  
The view above is particularly pertinent as it demonstrates that managers were aware 
that power is implicated in the knowledge appropriation regime, and was therefore a potential 
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source of resistance. It was noteworthy, however, that the scientists rejected the possibility 
that people failed to share for reasons of personal career interests. Similarly they did not 
support the management view that there was too much information. 
Our biggest problem is that there’s too much information on there and 
sometimes people don’t know how to find it. (Technologies and 
Engagement Manager) 
The scientists knew where to find information and how to locate potential collaborators. 
Their concerns were about the Portal not being ‘conversational’, ‘interactive’ and more 
importantly, resistance was framed in terms of professional diligence, reputation and identity. 
If you work in a project team and the results are very crucial for the 
business you might not want your senior person is already seeing 
results when it’s not really thought through finally … There is a lot of 
politics, I would say. It has more political reason than anything else … 
even the draft versions we wouldn’t let get out … We don’t want 
misinterpretation, we’re protecting ourselves. (Consumer Science 
Scientist).  
It is noteworthy that this person saw the process as political, in the sense of avoiding 
creating the wrong impression and inviting blame, as much as it was also about protecting 
one’s reputation.  
People can see that you’re making conclusions prematurely so every 
other piece of work you do is then looked on with less gravitas because 
people know that you make premature conclusions. (Principal Scientist 
2). 
This need for diligence and rigour was attributed to the nature of scientific training, as 
the scientist went on to explain: 
What you absolutely do not do is write informal comments about what 
you think is going to happen on a forum and you’re trained to not do 
that as a scientist and if you do start doing it you’re going to start 
finding that your managers start reining you back in as well, because 
your managers are going to want to sign off reports before they’re 
shared. They don’t want you to start putting thoughts on a forum … it 
would be inappropriate from a scientific point of view to put 
preliminary findings on a forum before you’ve rigorously done the 
science. (Principal Scientist 2)  
The foregoing also demonstrated a different form of peer pressure from the one 
described by the KMT who believed that scientists who did not participate would realize they 
were losing out on vital knowledge, and would therefore succumb to peer pressure to 
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participate. Rather than put pressure on individuals to share, some scientists would put 
pressure on members of a community not to share unsubstantiated claims. 
What invariably happens is that someone that likes to be process-
orientated and likes to be quality driven, starts to implement some 
rigour to these forums to stop people putting ad-hoc comments that 
can be misleading …people are discouraged from putting comments 
up that are unsubstantiated and not verifiable by scientific rigour, 
which then kills the whole forum and it stagnates. (Principal Scientist 2) 
According to this scientist, maintaining the ethos of sharing and collaboration 
paradoxically means accepting the very tenets they had been trained to eschew.  
The forums need to be essentially unmanaged, barely moderated at all 
and people need to accept there’ll be comments on there that are 
people’s thoughts on where they think the science is going to go that 
hasn’t been validated … But because we always strive to do things 
correctly, we strive for quality, we strive for perfection, we strive to do 
things professionally all of those things discourage people to put their 
immediate beliefs and their immediate scientific thoughts and their 
feelings out. (Principal Scientist 2)  
These contradictions reveal the fractured nature of the collaborative process, and 
demonstrate how the R&D staff themselves struggled to reconcile the realities of social 
networking with the rigour of scientific norms in sharing knowledge. Similarly, they require 
management to understand that not only is knowledge situated in a complex web of practices 
and professional norms, but also that a culture of ‘facilitation’ which is essentially top-down 
is inherently problematic to the extent that it fails to engage with the scientists’ everyday 
experience of knowledge-creation and sharing (see also Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). 
Concerns about intellectual property (IP) infringement found common ground between 
managers and scientists.  
The only time [access] is restricted is if there is IP involved, it is 
probably not shared as widely until the product is properly developed. 
(Process Systems Manager) 
Sometimes there are maybe patent issues, things that maybe will 
restrict those sorts of discussions. But on the whole and certainly in 
the project teams that I’ve worked in, I’ve found people to be quite 
open. (Principal Scientist 1)  
Sometimes when you’re working on things that are that new it’s a 
good idea not to have everyone aware of what you’re doing because it 
then ceases to be confidential when it starts to creep into the public 
domain. But normally if you feel that a skill set is missing, then it’s 
important to share….you normally seek out who might be an expert 
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and invite them to join you rather than display it to everybody in the 
company saying ‘does anyone have any ideas on this? … you need to 
lock down the intellectual property. (Polymer Chemist) 
This scientist cited an additional concern about inadvertent knowledge leakage when 
individuals interacted with outsiders. 
Information escaping from your organization is your main fear. The 
trouble is we have a lot of people who go and meet suppliers or talk to 
other people. So if we know that a group of people are working on 
this… even if it’s just in conversation, sometimes it can be enough to 
just say ‘oh Confect are doing that’ … but the trouble is you can’t 
control where some of that information goes. (Polymer Chemist)  
The above perspective is particularly important as it demonstrated that the scientists 
were protective of the knowledge and the portal within which it was created. They were 
prepared to police Confect-Portal to ensure the integrity of the system, both for the sake of 
the organization and also for their own job security and professional reputation. They had 
effectively tied their professional identity and destiny to the commercial success of the 
organization. Symbolic violence was thus assured and realized. We develop this analysis in 
more detail below.  
Symbolic violence in a context of knowledge appropriation 
The KM team use the symbolic power available to them to characterize Confect-Portal as a 
‘space of possibles’ which functions ‘as a system of common reference’ (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 
176), for sharing knowledge and defining how R&D scientists behave. They ensured that the 
real purposes of appropriating knowledge and re-affirming the extant structure of power 
relations are mis-recognized for what they really are. Furthermore, we suggest that these 
initiatives recursively define what constitutes capital, thus ensuring that managerial efforts to 
capture and absorb knowledge within Confect-Portal are at once mis-recognized and 
legitimized (Bourdieu, 1998). We observed above how collaborative efforts worked through 
socialization into a ‘caring culture’ as recognized both by management and the R&D staff. We 
examine this phenomenon with respect to the three elements of symbolic violence identified 
previously: pedagogy, misrecognition and the cultural arbitrary. 
The power of pedagogy 
Pedagogy is about learning, which is important for our purposes because it deals with the 
importance of sharing knowledge and networking. The portal brought with it a new form of 
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language: terms like facilitation, networking, interaction, research community, enhanced 
trust, knowledge capture, project team and even the name Confect-Portal itself came to 
symbolize the reality the KMT was keen to create. This lingua franca inculcated the virtues of 
knowledge-sharing and helped the scientists to forge their identity as knowledge-workers 
whether they engaged in Confect-Portal or not. By learning and accepting the language, they 
rendered the virtual knowledge-sharing space legitimate. 
         The complicity of organizational members thus elevated the rhetoric of facilitation and 
knowledge-sharing as part of the everyday reality of organizational functioning which started 
with the community of scientists, and was beginning to be acknowledged by other 
groups/divisions, in particular Human Resources, as reported by the KMT. Pedagogy works 
through a new form of language that is difficult to resist or reject because it appears ‘neutral 
and normal’ (Oakes et al., 1998, p. 272). The KMT sought to ‘change what is at stake’ by 
signalling that Confect was not just about generating new products; it was about how the firm 
constituted itself as a knowledge-sharing community. This was evident in the extensive 
media coverage, the public talks the GTD gave, the way the whole facilitation narrative was 
promulgated across the entire organization, as well as assessing managers on the extent to 
which they facilitated knowledge-sharing. When the learning fails to achieve the desired 
objectives, control can always be reinforced: when facilitation dries up, ‘you […] need 
continuity through management initiative’ (GTD). 
          The ultimate purpose of pedagogy as a mechanism for symbolic violence is to realize 
and legitimize control that works through complicity. This pursuit of legitimacy through the 
imposition of ideals built into a platform expected to play a unifying role and which is 
defined by misrecognition, renders Confect-Portal ideological (see also Beyer, 1981; 
Kamoche & Pinnington, 2012). We have shown how pedagogy relies on the socialization 
inherent in normative control, and suggest further that as a subtle control mechanism, it draws 
on the ‘unconscious strivings’ of employees (Willmott, 1993, p. 523) who are inspired to 
internalize the culture because failure to do so would be tantamount to questioning their very 
identity as a community of scientists. Thus, accepting rather than rejecting the virtual space 
allowed them to affirm and sustain the definitive characteristics of their identity, and to 
secure legitimacy for their own creative output. We see parallels here with the blend of ‘soft 
controls’ and formal bureaucratic practices to avoid ‘contestation’ and thus seek legitimacy 
for managerial strategies (Courpasson, 2000). At Confect, management achieved an 
important goal of enabling the scientists to appropriate the ‘managerial frame’ rather than to 
resist it, which in turn meant alignment with organizational control (Chreim, 2006).   
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The nature of misrecognition  
The elements of control and misrecognition, which we consider to be inter-related, are 
particularly pertinent to this case study. With regard to control, its effects are echoed in 
Barker’s (1993, p. 435) description of concertive control which creates ‘an iron cage whose 
bars are almost invisible to the workers it incarcerates.’ However, power and domination do 
not exist ‘only in terms of asymmetry of domination […] Domination, therefore implies 
action rather than submission’ (Courpasson, 2000, p. 144). Therefore, from a symbolic 
violence perspective, it could be argued that workers assume or are given license to 
reconfigure the bars as they deem fit: they participate on their own terms, rather than reject 
the ‘iron cage’ outright. This echoes Waring and Currie’s (2009) findings that doctors co-
opted and adapted bureaucratic patient safety procedures. The scientists at Confect in effect 
misrecognize the KMT’s motive for creating the iron cage in the first place. An example of 
management concealing or downplaying the pursuit of power/control is in the GTD’s 
exhortations to share knowledge ‘without letting the employees feel that managers are 
applying too much control’, which signals the intent to conceal or deny. Thus, symbolic 
violence manifested itself in its appeal for complicity via ‘voluntary participation’ while 
effectively mis-recognizing the inherent power relations that sustained and legitimized the 
knowledge-sharing and networking system. For Kerr and Robinson (2012), economic and 
symbolic violence were misrecognized as desirable capital for effective decision making.  
          Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975) apply the concept of reconnaissance sans connaissance 
(recognition without knowledge) to demonstrate how those who would have resisted the new 
order (in this case knowledge-sharing through Confect-Portal) instead lend their complicity 
and accept its legitimacy; they do not possess full knowledge of the dynamics underpinning 
their action (as the managerial control strategy has been concealed or denied), and have 
ultimately mis-interpreted i.e. misrecognized the managerial intent behind the KMT 
knowledge-sharing portal. The complicity of the scientists, which is a form of acquiescence, 
becomes, through the lens of symbolic violence, an example of meconnaisance 
(misrecognition). This constitutes a significant achievement for the KMT: as a ‘dominant’ 
group, they determine the appropriate cultural capital (‘membership’ of Confect-Portal), but 
without expressly requiring the R&D scientists to enlist, succeed in securing their willing 
participation, in the same way society comes to accept social stratification reproduced by an 
educational system which is essentially an extension of primary socialization (Bourdieu & 
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Passeron, 1977; DiMaggio, 1979). Equally significantly, the KMT anticipated that ‘peer 
pressure’ would ensure that the potential dissenters were in no position to reject it, even 
though the pressure ultimately manifested itself differently but achieved the desired result. 
The KMT expected that not only would the bars of the iron cage become truly invisible in 
Barker’s (1993) terms, but that the ‘inmates’ would police the iron cage through ‘peer 
pressure’ to ensure the potential dissenters stayed put, i.e. did not resist by failing to 
participate in the portal.  
            Misrecognition can manifest itself in more overt forms, e.g. through a culture of fear, 
public humiliations and hard-nosed management (Kerr & Robinson, 2012), by invoking 
public sympathy and affective relations amongst loyal followers (Robinson & Kerr, 2009), or 
by construing commercial pursuits as service to God (Kamoche & Pinnington, 2012). At 
Confect, failure to collaborate successfully is perceived in a poor light because such individuals 
lose the respect of their peers, an indictment on their professionalism and identity. This serves 
as an effective form of control, and is consistent with Bourdieu’s view of symbolic violence as 
‘the most economical mode of domination’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192). It is economical because 
it relies on little or no effort on the part of the dominant party, yet it is effective because the 
dominated internalize the desired behavioural change and act accordingly. 
  
The effects of the ‘cultural arbitrary’  
Bourdieu (1977) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) use the notion of a ‘cultural arbitrary’ to 
explain how the French educational system realizes the interests of the dominant 
groups/classes, reproducing while masking its contribution to these interests. Misrecognition 
illustrates the effect of imposing a ‘cultural arbitrary’ to express the objective interests of the 
dominant groups/classes (the KMT), while concealing its role in securing control. At Confect, 
misrecognition took place to the extent that the cultural arbitrary concealed its role in 
securing control and knowledge appropriation, but, ironically, was assisted by the fact that 
the scientists protected their own interests as well. This represents an unanticipated aspect of 
symbolic violence, which we examine below with regard to resistance.    
         A cultural arbitrary also operates by denying yet rendering certain ideas as 
‘unthinkable’. According to Oakes et al. (1998) museums and cultural heritage sites portray 
themselves as a ‘business’, yet treat as ‘unthinkable’ ideas such as ‘being business-like’, 
‘efficiency’, etc. They pursue yet conceal economic capital, thus demonstrating the notion of 
misrecognition. Confect-Portal assumed the character of a Bourdieusian cultural arbitrary by 
24 
 
excluding notions such as profitability/productivity and knowledge-appropriation, yet these 
were at the heart of what it meant to run a successful business that tapped into the knowledge 
of Confect’s most creative community of researchers. Similarly, Kamoche and Pinnington 
(2012) argue that when proponents of organizational spirituality deny the centrality of profits 
and productivity, while claiming that the purpose of business is to serve God, they are 
invoking a ‘cultural arbitrary’ rooted in symbolic violence. By insisting that performance 
evaluation mechanisms and rewards were not brought into the equation, the KMT invoked 
the cultural arbitrary which concealed these ideas as ‘unthinkable’ and encouraged the belief 
that the purpose of Confect-Portal was simply to provide researchers the space to share 
knowledge. Yet, if the knowledge did not translate into marketable products, it is doubtful 
whether the organization would have continued to support it.  
          The scientists were also categorical: they were not motivated by personal financial gain 
or organizational performance, but instead saw their identity as scientists engaged in 
innovation through networking. This view also demonstrates that the control mechanism in 
place differs from concertive control which explicitly rewards specified forms of behaviour, 
thus demonstrating further the ‘value-added’ of our analysis. Without implying manipulation 
on the part of the KMT (which in any case, would be inconsistent with Bourdieu’s conception 
of symbolic violence), we argue that the scientists are placed in a situation where the denial or 
rejection of Confect-Portal as the right way to order their working life through collaboration 
and networking is rendered ‘unthinkable’. 
Compliance as discursive resistance 
While research that treats resistance as efforts to limit the influence of managerial power 
(Ackroyd, 1996), is still valid, an emerging critique has challenged the unquestioning 
perspective of resistance as the rejection of practices, policies and new-fangled change 
initiatives by disgruntled workers (see Ezzamel, Willmott, & Worthington, 2001; Symon, 
2005; Thomas & Davies, 2005). This suggests a shift from structuralist explanations to an 
engagement with subjectivity and discursive practices. Resistance may manifest itself 
through rhetorical devices (Symon, 2005), theorized at the level of meanings and 
subjectivities (Thomas & Davies, 2005), and can occur to defend or express identity 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2001), as at Confect, and where subjectivities 
are important, but not fixed constructs (Ball & Wilson, 2000; Clegg, 1994). It cannot be 
assumed that symbolic violence tenable through control strategies always works as expected.   
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         The scope for resistance exists not because of some pre-existing structural asymmetry, 
but because the KMT lacked a complete picture of the scientists’ reality of knowledge-
sharing practices and ethos. The KMT believed there was too much information, and that 
Confect-Portal was a dynamic platform for networking; the scientists had alternative 
mechanisms for networking and sometimes saw the portal as a static archive/repository, ‘not 
conversational’, ‘not interactive’. Furthermore, the initial response to the culture of top-down 
sharing, or in the words of the GTD, to ‘push people into sharing’ was resisted, and it only 
gained acceptance when it was left to their discretion; only then did compliance materialize, 
on their own terms. We found that peer pressure worked in unexpected ways. Consistent with 
symbolic violence, peer pressure ultimately worked not merely by compelling scientists to 
participate in knowledge-sharing, but to participate in a conscientious manner whereby they 
protected themselves from deleterious politics, protected identity interests - reputation and 
‘gravitas’, hence their own capital in a contested field (Bourdieu, 1993), while also realizing 
the interests of the dominant group, i.e. the organizational asset of intellectual property rights. 
We interpret the actions of the R&D scientists as acceptance that participating in knowledge-
sharing on Confect-Portal through collaboration and networking is consonant with their 
identity as creators of scientific knowledge. Their response to the virtual space was informed 
by their individual dispositions in terms of who they were as (highly skilled, mostly 
autonomous, reputation-conscious) scientists. Thus, the form of resistance to be inferred was 
not a rejection of managerial strategy to use and legitimize Confect-Portal, but a discursive 
compromise which echoed the adoption/adaptation of managerial procedures (Waring & 
Currie, 2009), subsumed agency, and re-affirmed their identity. Thus, while compliance 
constituted a form of discursive resistance, ultimately it demonstrates the effectiveness of 
symbolic violence as a control mechanism for professionals. 
 
Conclusion 
The creation and appropriation of knowledge is defined by contests over meaning, identity 
and ‘ownership’, especially where ‘property rights’ are ill-defined and ambiguous (Bowman 
& Swart, 2007; Grant, 1996). Yet, the role of managerial control in these processes has not 
always been understood as researchers have tended to assume that professionals can be 
managed through socialization, rewards and ‘congruent’ values and norms. In an attempt to 
go beyond extant forms of control we drew from Bourdieu’s social theory to examine how 
knowledge-sharing exhortations might be interpreted as an appeal for complicity which 
worked because the scientists tied their involvement in the portal to the way they defined 
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themselves, a process which allowed them to protect their capital in Bourdieusian terms. We 
examined how an organization sought to strengthen the way it appropriates knowledge from 
its R&D scientists not by requiring them to participate in its new-fangled virtual space, nor 
by proffering (financial) incentives as in prior conceptions of normative/concertive control, 
but by seeking to facilitate a subtle blend of ‘voluntary participation’ and presumed ‘peer 
pressure’. This approach, which we interpret as ‘symbolic violence’, appeared to rely 
implicitly on the idea of seeking voluntary compliance by motivating individuals to 
collaborate and re-affirm their sense of identity within the virtual space (confer Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000). The knowledge management team not only sought acceptance for a virtual 
knowledge-sharing space, but also, in the process, realized the legitimacy of their efforts to 
appropriate knowledge. The creation of Confect-Portal must therefore be interpreted not 
merely as a virtual space to create and share knowledge but an arena within which the 
managerial prerogative in knowledge appropriation comes to be re-affirmed through 
symbolic violence.  
          The scientists came to accept the legitimacy of the portal as part of their everyday work, 
and it became, for them, the right way to think and behave, even though their motivations for 
doing so were somewhat at odds with those advanced by management. Following Bourdieu 
and Passeron (1977, p. 206) we contend that accepting the rationale for sharing and 
networking justifies the existence of Confect-Portal while misrecognizing the ultimate 
purpose which is to create and appropriate codifiable knowledge, rather than merely to share 
it. By appealing to the scientists’ sense of identity and by counting on their inherent tendency 
to police themselves as professionals, the risk of overt resistance is effectively neutralized. 
The scientists not only take pride in their ability to collaborate and derive satisfaction from 
the subsequent product outcomes; they also disregard the opportunity to make self-interested 
appropriative claims on their knowledge beyond deriving intrinsic satisfaction and symbolic 
rewards. This scenario reveals an ideological ethos in the way both management and the 
scientists subscribe to the ‘shared’ interest of networking and knowledge-sharing while 
ignoring the fact that efforts to appropriate knowledge constitute a reconfiguration of material 
interests (Beyer, 1981). Hence, the potential incongruity of the scientists’ and Confect’s 
interests is swept under the ideological carpet by the broom of ‘facilitation’ which acts as a 
surrogate for control. 
         In terms of limitations and further research, we acknowledge that the relatively small 
number of scientists we were allowed to speak to is not necessarily representative of the 
entire population of the community in question. We hope, however, that this paper has 
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furthered our understanding of organizational control, knowledge sharing, and Bourdieusian 
social theory in a field that has tended to assume ‘value consensus’ in sharing knowledge. 
Further research could examine how the insights generated here might be tied to the theory of 
knowledge as situated practices in order to further interrogate the context of the knowledge-
creators (e.g. Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). Such an enterprise would be fruitful to the extent 
that ‘the human agent’s understanding resides, first and foremost, in the practices in which he 
participates’ (Tsoukas, 1996, p. 16). However, following Ringberg and Reihlen (2008) we 
acknowledge the role of cognitive processes in making sense of knowledge embedded in 
practices, and propose that further research might consider how cognitive processes might be 
incorporated into a conception of knowledge-users’ predispositions, hence Bourdieusian 
habitus.  
          We hope to engender further research into the problematic nature of exhortations to 
share knowledge in different organizational contexts, especially where such sharing is 
instigated centrally and fails to take adequate account of the everyday practices, sense-
making abilities, as well as interests of those being asked to share knowledge. Research in 
this genre will enhance our understanding of the realities of knowledge-appropriation as 
knowledge comes to be understood more and more not merely as a source of competitive 
advantage but also as a contested asset. We have focused on managerial control strategies as 
constituting symbolic violence. Yet, relations of domination can be construed with a reversal 
of roles, rather than ‘top-down control, bottom-up resistance’, for example if scientists at 
Confect designed their own portal; where professionals co-opt/adapt managerial procedures 
(Waring & Currie, 2009); where professionals are perceived as more powerful than managers 
(Swan et al., 2002), and so forth; further research might consider how such groups use 
symbolic violence towards management or other groups (e.g. the R&D portal influencing 
other departments).  
         We see Bourdieu’s work providing significant opportunities to interpret organizational 
action. For example, Waring and Currie (2009, p. 774) state that as professionals internalize 
management techniques, ‘it negates the need for top-down management controls over 
professionals as it fosters conformity from within professional work’ – we see this as the 
essence of symbolic violence. We are aware that some scholars consider Bourdieu’s work 
obscure, methodologically imprecise, and even incoherent (e.g. Alexander, 1995; DiMaggio, 
1979; Fowler, 2000; Thompson, 1984). Calhoun (1995) argues that symbolic violence implies 
determinism, yet as Oakes et al. (1998) point out, for Bourdieu, strategizing to obtain 
important positions does not imply rational calculative decision-making. This indeterminacy 
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suggests the need for caution in interpreting the behaviour of the Confect scientists and the 
need for further research into agents’ behaviour where symbolic violence does not, as 
DiMaggio (1979) argues, provide for social change. Also, contrary to Bourdieu’s position, 
the Confect case demonstrates that symbolic violence does not necessarily imply 
undermining the capital of the ‘dominated’. In fact, our reflexive approach demonstrates how 
the ‘dominated’ ultimately acquire the capacity to strengthen their capital.  
           Further research might also consider how scientists’ habitus, in particular their 
dispositions from past socialization, determines their decision to share or not to share 
knowledge, and how managers can begin to comprehend the specific nature of ‘discursive 
practices’ (Tsoukas, 1996) of sharing knowledge that come to be accepted by scientists through 
their application in the everyday discourse of creating new products, yet remain largely alien to 
managers. A related issue is the important practical implication of involving end-users in the 
creation of knowledge management systems, which did not happen at Confect. In closing we 
note that our analysis has relevance not merely for the individual orientations to sharing 
knowledge and networking, but also for other organizational communities/professionals. 
Further research might examine how other categories of both ‘dominants’ and ‘dominated’ 
negotiate their relationship at work vis-à-vis the reality of the contested terrain of facilitation 
and similar tools of control, thus leading to a more discursive approach to knowledge 
appropriation and power relations. 
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